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Successful Command
Lieutenant-General Robert Moncel on Wartime Leaders

J.L. Granatstein

R

obert Moncel was the youngest
brigadier in Canadian history,
promoted to that rank at age 27.
Born in Montreal in 1917, he was a
subaltern in the Victoria Rifles in
Montreal when broke out, and he
proceeded overseas in 1939 with
the Royal Canadian Regiment.
After several command and staff
appointments, he led an armoured
brigade with great success in 1944-45.
After the war, Moncel served
at Army Headquarters, in the US
and UK, and was successively
Quartermaster General and Vice
Chief of the Defence Staff. He left the
Canadian Forces in 1966 at the time of
unification. He died in 2007.
I met Moncel at a mess dinner
at Camp Borden in 1960. A brash
officer cadet, I asked him to get me
access to the files of the Directorate
of History at Army Headquarters
for the B.A. thesis I was planning to
write at the Royal Military College
(RMC) on Canada and Peacekeeping.
Amazingly, he did so, and I have
been grateful to him ever since. When
I interviewed him in 1991, three
decades later, he was an impressive
figure, intelligent, opinionated,
precise. Those qualities, I think, show
in his comments below.
This interview has been lightly
edited. The original transcript of
the interview, one of the many I

Abstract: Lieutenant-General Robert
Moncel was the youngest brigadier
in Canadian history and commanded
the 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade
in Northwest Europe from 1944-1945
with great success. This transcript
of an interview conducted by J.L.
Granatstein contains Moncel’s views
on a wide range of issues related to
the Canadian army of the Second
World War, especially his candid views
of many senior commanders including
Guy Simonds,

conducted for The Generals: The
Canadian Army’s Senior Commanders in
the Second World War, is in my papers
at the York University Archives. A
copy of the full set of interviews has
been deposited at the Directorate
of History and Heritage, National
Defence Headquarters in Ottawa.

*****
General Robert Moncel
interview, Mahone Bay, NS,
6 October 1991

W

e began by talking about the
Permanent Force. He was no
admirer, remarking on the “miserable
performance” of many PFers and
Royal Military College graduates
in the war. They had everything
going for them technically, including
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staff college, much more than the
militia but a lot ended up after four
years of war as captains or majors
and as drunks. They were like the
English, either very good or bloody
awful. Of course, the Non-Permanent
Active Militia (NPAM) wasn’t much
different with the good and the bad.
He apologized for sounding a snob,
but those NPAM (and RMC) officers
who had gone to private schools and
had responsibility as prefects and
who joined good – i.e. city – NPAM
regiments did well. They knew
what responsibility was, they could
take and give orders, and they had
good minds – Bruce Matthews, for
example. The NPAM officers from
rural regiments were much less good
and in many cases outsiders had to be
brought in to run them. The RCRs, he
said, stocked large numbers of these.
He mentioned the 12th Manitoba
Dragoons that he was sent to whip
into line. The commanding officer,
J.S. McMahon, was Simonds’
RMC classmate and the second-incommand was Gordon Churchill
[later a Diefenbaker minister]. They
had to be chopped, hadn’t a clue, no
trades training, etc. The squadron
leaders were drunk in the afternoon.
They had to go, and he got new
officers and an RSM from the RCRs,
created new badges and shoulder
flashes, and broke the regiment into
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Brigadier R.W. Moncel (right) with
Colonel J.L. Ralston, the Canadian
minister of national defence, October
1944.

training squadrons and worked them
hard for 5 months. No one told him
how to do this.
He agreed the NPAM generals
at the onset of war were terrible, but
there was no one else. Mind you, the
PF had its problems too in 1939. He
joined the RCRs where companies
had a strength of 40 and had one
light machine gun. The officers were
drunks – he poured his company
commander into bed every night.
The RCR CO (Hodson) hated staff
(staff college was “a forcing ground
for shits”), and believed decorations
or praise shouldn’t be offered. But
they were soon weeded out. He said
he had the RCR carrier platoon and
a UK officer told him his men should
be drawing trades pay. So he went to
see Dan Spry, a lifelong friend, who
was adjutant and asked to see the war
establishment (WE). This shocked
Spry and the CO because the WE was
secret, they said. But eventually these
regulars agreed that trades pay was
permitted. Astonishing they’d not
known this.
He took the carrier platoon to
France in June 1940 and after the
retreat was told by a Brit officer to
destroy them. He flatly refused and
78
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got them loaded on a ship as ballast
after ordering his platoon sergeant
to shoot the officer if necessary. They
finally landed in Southampton to
hear a band playing – for a tea dance.
He was told to turn over his carriers
to the general pool, refused, and was
rescued by Boy Browning [General
Sir Frederick Browning] whom he’d
met on a course. When he got back
to the RCR mess, two weeks after
everyone else, the CO chased him out
for looking scruffy.
How then did the PF produce a
Simonds? He was just a baby in 1939,
a captain, but he loved the business.
He was Moncel’s idol, mentor and
the only one of the whole bunch
with talent, brains, guts. After the
war, the government, frightened
of him, treated him badly; indeed,
the government was mean to all the
generals postwar.
He met Simonds when he got
sent to the first war staff course
Simonds ran and he stood first in the
course. Simonds was a lieutenantcolonel, dapper, smartly turned out,
and knew what he was doing. He
didn’t see him again for some time.
Moncel’s posting after staff
college was as GSO 3 at Corps (where

he never saw McNaughton) which he
hated and from which he was rescued
by F.F. Worthington and made first
a GSO 3 and then brigade major
and finally GSO 1 of his division.
Worthington was the kindest, nicest
man, the most enthusiastic, and
the most divorced from reality. He
regularly proclaimed his brigade
and eventually his division ready
for action when it was nothing like
it – no gunnery, no tradesmen. That
was his weakness, an inability to see
reality. Even though he understood
armoured tactics and was the only
one who believed in the tank, Moncel
doubts he could have commanded
in action: he’d have been at the front
with his sword waving. He wanted
to see blood on the tracks.
He remembered an exercise
Worthington’s brigade had to put
on for Montgomery. Worthington
wouldn’t make a plan or let Moncel
do up one. When the day arrived,
he told Moncel to simply say “how
would you proceed, Brigadier?”
and turn it over to him. He blew it,
made Monty restless and angry, and
Worthington left in a huff. To Moncel,
this was typical of the PF. He said
Worthington and McNaughton got
2
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on well because both liked gadgetry.
McNaughton was fascinated by
Worthington’s workshop.
He remembered E.W. Sansom
who was incompetent, and he
recalled that Ernie read a book
describing a desert corps commander
who travelled with a truck full of
cable so he could unroll the line and
stay in contact wherever he was.
Sansom decided to try this in the UK,
got Fin Clark, his chief signals officer,
to put the Corps’ whole cable reserve
on a truck and it was a disaster. In
the UK the line got cut everywhere.
The problem with him, as corps
commander, was that he gave no
direction. He told Moncel to produce
a plan for a big exercise, and he did
so; Sansom flipped through it and
said it looked great. That was all. But
he was fun in the mess and it was a
party every night. Moncel said that he
was asked to get Sansom drunk so he
could be fired on those grounds. He
refused. But Sansom was ultimately
sacked anyhow. He and McNaughton
lived in another world.
When Simonds took over the
Corps things changed. Moncel was
GSO l and Simonds gave him a plan
he’d written out in long hand for

distribution. Moncel changed a few
things and sent it out. When Simonds
saw this he called him and reamed
him out: “Don’t you ever do that
again.” He had the palest blue eyes
and looked like a hawk. He gave
direction; he knew what he wanted,
and the UK generals respected him
which they didn’t other Canadians.
Simonds had come from Italy
to take the Corps and Moncel was
the junior member in A Mess. Each
morning at breakfast another staff
officer was gone until finally only
Moncel was left. Simonds smiled and
said “you’re staying.” He brought in
his own people from Italy and he was
right to can the Corps staff he did. His
people performed well.
He was great to work for. He
knew what he wanted and he had
confidence in his people to leave
them alone to do their job. He knew
they’d break their neck to carry out
his wishes. Many were frightened of
him, but not Moncel. He travelled
with him at the front, saw him in
all kinds of circumstances and they
became good friends.
Simonds didn’t like Charles
Foulkes. When his 2nd Division
was to stage an attack, Simonds was

just behind division HQ waiting
for the scheduled attack to go in at
0600 hours. Simonds had risen at
0500 hours. The barrage was late
(0620 hours) and Simonds said “I’m
going over to relieve the Division
commander.” Moncel urged delay,
it wouldn’t help the battle. Simonds
looked at him with his hawklike glare
and agreed: “you owe me one.” The
battle was a disaster, like everything
Foulkes touched. Foulkes’ rise was,
to Moncel, inexplicable. His staff was
poor – he attracted poor officers. He
said once Foulkes was cut off and
one of Moncel’s officers (when he
had 4th Armoured Brigade) rescued
him. Moncel couldn’t forgive the
officer for that.
Moncel talked about courage in
battle. He said when he took over
his brigade he visited his artillery
regiment, commanded by an RMC
grad. The second-in-command was
at the gun lines and the CO was back
with the transport. This happened
again and finally the second-incommand said the CO wouldn’t come
forward. Moncel went to see him,
pleaded, failed, and had to can him.
The CO had run a good regiment in
the UK, but he couldn’t stand up to

Brigadier R.W. Moncel, commander
of 4th Canadian Armoured Brigade,
Tillburg, Netherlands, 19 March 1945.
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action. Why? No way of predicting
who does well and who doesn’t.
You were often wrong. Who’d have
expected Fred Tilston or David
Currie to get VCs?
He said that when George
Kitching was canned it was because
he’d been let down by his brigadiers.
Brigadier E.L. Booth was brave and
experienced but he put his HQ in
three tanks during Operation Totalize
and when he was killed there was no
communication to 4th Division HQ.
Kitching couldn’t find out what was
up, and the attack ground to a halt.
The key was, as Simonds said, to
have HQ in a safe place with good
communications; then the CO could
go forward while his HQ stayed in
touch. It took five days before Moncel
learned he was to take over Booth’s
brigade.
He said he’d once before been
told he was to be promoted. Just
before D-Day, Brigadier R.A. Wyman
blabbed the plans and Monty was
furious and wanted him canned.
Moncel was tapped for the job, but
Simonds changed his mind, saying
it was wrong to change commanders
then. Wyman took the brigade in
and got wounded before he could
be relieved.
Totalize was Simonds’ plan.
Moncel didn’t think he had asked
too much of green regiments. It
would have worked as the troops
(Ned Amy, he mentioned) got on
their objectives but then no orders
came through. The brigadiers were
inexperienced. Possibly Simonds
ought to have taken that into account.
Simonds had charisma and the
troops saw it. Perhaps he aped Monty
too much with his black beret, and
that helped make some hate him. The
Brits put up with idiosyncrasy better
than Canadians. Still he was charming
and great fun, a challenge at all times.
He recalled after the war at a Cabinet
Defence Committee, Simonds was
trying to get the Canadian Guards
authorized and one minister queried
this. Simonds said, “when the mobs
80
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storm Parliament Hill, you will be
glad to have two loyal battalions.”
He talked about how a
commander can’t believe a CO who
says the men are tired. Too often it
was the commander who was tired.
He recalled Simonds being told
troops were “pinned to the ground”
and on going forward found the
men lying in the sun. He fired all the
commanders. They ought to have
been going forward to see things
themselves. A brigadier should go
down to company level to see what
was up. Moreover, good brigadiers
had gone to staff college and had a
sense of inter-arm cooperation and
of the resources available. He recalled
sitting in on a brigadier’s Orders
Group when, on being offered extra
artillery and armour support, the
brigadier refused. The attack was a
disaster and 200 died. Officers got
tired and stopped caring. They ought
to have been relieved – with honour.
The problem wasn’t the men –
they were superb. It was the officers.
Still by the end of the war the First
Canadian Army was superb. It could
move instantly, it was magnificent,
and it had taken five years to build
it. His brigade was superb, tough
and efficient. A bad brigadier could
lose in a day what Moncel’s brigade
lost in all of Northwest Europe – 350
killed. The Germans, he added, were
a ragtag lot, though their good units
were superb. And the Canadians
had such equipment in such quantity
it was extravagant to the point of
immorality.
He wasn’t a great admirer of
Chris Vokes who ended the war as
his division commander (though
they had riotous times postwar and
were friends). He knew nil about
armour and wasn’t a happy camper
in Northwest Europe. He only rarely
came to see Moncel’s brigade (2-3
times) and left him on his own. This
was because the orders came from
Corps and the division commanders
had little to do. He did recall one
day Vokes came to his HQ when

they were being shelled and Vokes
jumped into a trench with his tinhat
on, while Moncel’s officers walked
around. One kept saluting Vokes
every time he passed his trench.
(Moncel had laid down that staff
officers wore caps, not tin hats. He
remembered being in a doorway with
Harry Foster at Caen under fire when
two privates jumped in for shelter.
“You’re a general?” “Yes.” “You can
do what you want?” “Yes.” “Well,
if I was a general I’d get the hell out
of here.”) Vokes ran his occupation
force like a warlord.
He saw little of Harry Crerar. He
was a gent with a lovely wife, who
liked to have RMC boys around (he
mentioned Bill Anderson especially,
saying it was terrible that he wasn’t
allowed to command a unit in action
but was kept at Army HQ.)
George Pearkes, he said, was
like Worthington who’d have had
his sword in hand in the attack. He
actually travelled with a trumpeter
and once introduced Mrs. Churchill
as Mrs. Attlee. His brains had been
blown out in World War I.
Dan Spry, he said, recovered
from being canned and did well. Rod
Keller left him cold – like Vokes too
much blood and guts.
To him Ottawa wasn’t the enemy;
Canadian Military HQ was, though
this ceased once they got into action.
He also said that he had no sense
that reinforcements were short. Not
in armoured regiments and not in his
motorized infantry.

J.L. Granatstein has received the Order
of Canada and the Pierre Berton Award,
among other distinctions. He is the former
director and CEO of the Canadian War
Museum.
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